Does the effect of public support for R&D depend on the degree of appropriability?. by Gelabert, Liliana et al.
DOES THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR R&D







We explore the interaction between public support for R&D and
appropriability using a dataset constructed from the Spanish Commu-
nity Innovation Survey, for the period 2000–2005. We ﬁnd that public
support policy is less able to stimulate privately ﬁnanced internal R&D
in ﬁrms where appropriability mechanisms are more effective. On
average, the effect of public support for R&D is three times larger for
those ﬁrms reporting a level of appropriability below the median vis-
a ` -vis those ﬁrms for which appropriability is above the median level.
Furthermore, for supported ﬁrms with the highest degree of appro-
priability, crowding out cannot be ruled out.
I. INTRODUCTION
INNOVATION POLICY IS ONE OF THE MAJOR CHALLENGES for policy makers in
developedcountries.PublicinterventioninR&Dactivities isjustiﬁedbythe
imperfect appropriability that applies to knowledge production (Arrow
[1962], Nelson [1959]). The implication of this market failure is that ﬁrms
underinvest in R&D activities since they cannot fully appropriate the social
returnsstemmingfromtheirinnovations.Inthiscontext,governmentshave
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1threepotentialmechanismstoalleviatesuchmarketfailure:ﬁrst,byundertaking
public R&D activities through research institutes or national laboratories or
contracting out R&D activities to private ﬁrms in those areas where
appropriability problems are acute; second, by strengthening the protection
for intellectual property rights (IPR), thereby increasing the share of social
returns that the innovator can ultimately appropriate; ﬁnally, by implementing
incentive mechanisms like tax beneﬁts, subsidies or public loans at low/null
interest rates, which, in turn, would reduce R&D costs for private ﬁrms.
1
In this paper we deal with the latter mechanism, namely, public support
forR&D.Thedominantthemeoftheliteratureonpublicsupportpoliciesis
related to their net effect on ﬁrm R&D investment, that is, assessing
empirically the extent to which public support induces or substitutes
privately ﬁnanced R&D expenses (see Hall and Van Reenen [2000], Klette
et al. [2000], David et al. [2000] for surveys of the existing literature). We
offer a new twist to this literature by focusing on the contingencies that
moderate the effect of R&D support policies, rather than by just measuring
their impact on privately ﬁnanced R&D spending. Put differently, our
objective here is to explain the heterogeneity across ﬁrms in the effect of
R&Dsupportpolicies.Speciﬁcally,wefocusontheroleplayedbythedegree
ofappropriability,i.e.,theabilitytoappropriatetherentsassociatedwithan
innovation. Although the concept of appropriability is central to the
theoretical argument that justiﬁes public intervention in R&D activities
(Arrow [1962]), to the best of our knowledge, there is no attempt in the
literature to incorporate appropriability issues when assessing the effect of
R&D support policies empirically.
DrawingondatafromtheSpanishCommunityInnovationSurvey(CIS),
for the period 2000–2005, we ﬁnd that the elasticity of privately ﬁnanced
R&D expenditures with respect to public support decreases with the degree
of appropriability. That is, ﬁrms that have reported that mechanisms to
protect innovation are more effective respond with a smaller increase in
privately ﬁnanced R&D when they receive public support. Moreover, when
protectionmechanismsareidentiﬁedasbeingextremelyeffective,wecannot
rule out the existence of crowding out, i.e., the amount of investment in
R&D, net of the government support, shrinks. This ﬁnding is robust to
several controls for the endogeneity of public support, and for unobserved
heterogeneity across ﬁrms. It is also robust to the inclusion of other
determinantsoftheeffectivenessofpublicsupportdiscussedintheliterature
such as, for instance, ﬁrm size and ﬁnancial constraints (Hyytinen and
Toivanen [2005], Gonza ´ lez and Pazo ´ [2008]), and across different empirical
models (2SLS, Tobit, matching approach). Although, theoretically, there
are several explanations as to why this could happen, an intuitive
1Both IPR protection and public support policies are formulated to have a direct effect on
privateincentivestoinnovatebyenhancingproﬁtabilityandreducingR&Dcosts,respectively.
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ask for public support purely as a way of reducing the cost of projects that
were proﬁtable in the ﬁrst place without such support; whereas those ﬁrms
that face appropriability problems are more likely to ask for public support
in order to make an R&D project proﬁtable.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II summarizes the
existing literature on public support for R&D activities, motivates our study
andexplainsitscontribution.SectionIIIdescribesthedataandvariablesused
in the empirical analysis. In section IV we discuss the endogeneity bias
affectingpublicsupport, present our instrument, andreportthe results ofthe
baseline empirical model, namely, a two-stage least squares estimation with
ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Section V presents several robustness checks that further
corroborate our main ﬁnding. The paper concludes with some ﬁnal remarks.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTION
The extensive literature reviewed by Jaffe [1996] documents the presence of
spilloversinR&Dactivities.Acrucialconsequenceofthesespilloversisthat
thevaluegeneratedbyinnovationmaybecapturedby:competitors,owners
ofcomplementary assets, consumers, etc. (Teece, [1986]). Hence, asaresult,
ﬁrmswouldtendtoinvestbelowthesociallyoptimallevelofR&D(Griliches
[1992]). Does public support for R&D activities solve this market failure?
A necessary condition for an afﬁrmative answer is that privately ﬁnanced
R&Dexpenditures increase after aﬁrm receives public support. This occurs
because public support can reduce both the ﬁxed and the marginal cost of
R&Dactivity.Lach[2002]suggeststhatthelikelihoodofstimulatingfurther
private R&D expenditures is higher when the subsidized project involves
setting-up or upgrading research facilities that have the potential to lower
the ﬁxed costs of other current, or future, non-subsidized R&D projects. In
addition to the direct effect, public support for R&D might also have an
indirect effect that lowers further the marginal cost of R&D activities.
Lerner [1999] and Hall [2002], among others, argue that public support
could represent a positive endorsement of the quality of a ﬁrm’s R&D
activity in the eyes of potential investors which, in turn, reduces their
required return when providing additional funds. For instance, Lerner
[1999] mentions, as an example, that specialists at the National Institutes of
Health or at the Department of Defense may have considerable insight





matching ﬁrms. He ﬁnds that while awardees and matching ﬁrms did not differ signiﬁcantly in
thelikelihoodofreceivingprivateventurecapitalintheyearspriortotheaward,insubsequent
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probabilities to avoid appearing to squander public money (Lach, [2002],
Wallsten [2000]). In this situation, the ﬁrm does not decide to invest
additionalmoneyinthesubsidizedprojectasaconsequenceofreceivingthe
grant.
3 Moreover, David et al. [2000] argue that, even if the grant attracts
additional private money into the subsidized project, the overall effect on
privately ﬁnanced R&D expenditures can still be negative because the
private money ﬂowing to the subsidized project may come from other non-
subsidized ones. In particular, they claim that an inelastic supply of R&D
inputswhichdrives pricesup,togetherwithliquidity constraints,reducethe
cost effectiveness of investing in non-subsidized projects. As a result, a ﬁrm
may decide to discontinue an active R&D project in order to allocate those
resources to the subsidized one. In this situation, the amount of privately
ﬁnanced R&D expenditures may increase, or decrease, depending on the
relative importance of each project.
The existing evidence about the effectiveness of R&D public support
policies is rather mixed. David et al. [2000] systematically survey the
econometric work over the last 35 years and suggest that conﬂicting results
arise from: different levels of aggregation; the multiplicity of econometric
techniques; the existence of different national support programs and a lack
of a formal framework. Most importantly, most of the older studies do not
properly take into account the potential endogeneity of public support, i.e.,
public support is not randomly allocated across ﬁrms.
More recent studies on the evaluation of R&D policies, all of which
control for endogeneity, still provide conﬂicting results. For instance,
Wallsten [2000] ﬁnds that grants provided by the Small Business and
Innovation Program (a U.S. program directed at providing grants to small
ﬁrms), crowd out privately ﬁnanced R&D, dollar for dollar. On the
contrary, Lach [2002] shows that subsidies induce 11 additional monetary
units of in-house R&D for each unit of subsidy received by small Israeli
ﬁrms,whiletheeffectisnegative,albeitinsigniﬁcantly,forlargeIsraeliﬁrms.
Czarnitzki and Licht [2006] ﬁnd a large degree of additionality in public
R&D grants in relation to privately ﬁnanced R&D expenses in Germany,
with a more pronounced effect in Eastern Germany during the transition
years, the awardees were signiﬁcantly more likely to receive such ﬁnancing. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the receipt of awards playing an important role in certifying ﬁrm quality.
3However, even when crowding out occurs on the subsidized project, the overall effect on a
ﬁrm’s privately ﬁnanced R&D expenditures depends on the ﬁnal assignation of the funds
releasedbythesubsidy.Iftheﬁrmisliquidityconstrained,itcoulddecidetoundertakeanother
project that could not have otherwise been ﬁnanced; thus, counterbalancing the substitution
effect on the subsidized project.
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R&D using a sample of 147 ﬁrms, and ﬁnds that for 30% of the ﬁrms, full
crowding out cannot be ruled out. More recently, Gonza ´ lez et al. [2005]
address the same issue using a panel of about 2,000 ﬁrms. The econometric
analysiscontrolsforthecensoringoftheR&Dvariableandforthepotential
endogeneity ofpublicgrants.Theyﬁndthatpublicsubsidiesplayapositive,
although modest, role. The estimated percentage increase in privately
ﬁnanced R&D expenditures is higher for the smallest ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are
also more likely to start R&D activities after receiving a subsidy. However,
the analysis also suggests that subsidies go mainly to ﬁrms that would have
performed innovative activities irrespective of such subsidies.
Such conﬂicting ﬁndings may suggest that the effect of public support for
stimulating R&D activities is contingent on ﬁrm characteristics and, thus,
heterogeneous across recipient ﬁrms. A few studies have focused on the
moderating role ofﬁrm size.Speciﬁcally, Lach[2002],Gonza ´ lezet al.[2005]
and Gonza ´ lez and Pazo ´ [2008] provide evidence consistent with the notion




Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005], using survey data for Finland, show that
government funding disproportionately helps ﬁrms from industries that are
dependent on external ﬁnancing.
Wefollowthislineofresearchand,speciﬁcally,investigatetheinteraction
between public support and appropriability on a ﬁrm’s privately ﬁnanced
R&D expenditures. To the best of our knowledge this relationship has not
yetbeenaddressedintheexistingliteratureonR&D policies;neither from a
theoretical nor empirical point of view. This is even more surprising if one
takes into account the fact that governments can inﬂuence the degree of
appropriability by, for instance, enforcing stricter IPR protection. Hence,
appropriabilityandpublicsupportforR&Daretwoalternative channelsto
affectdirectlyaﬁrm’sincentivetoinnovate.Showingthatonepolicyismore
or less effective when the other is also implemented actively is both
interesting from an empirical standpoint and relevant in practice. Thus, our
papernot only contributes tothe existing literature byproposing adifferent
lens through which the heterogeneity in the effect of R&D subsidies can be
analyzed, but it also sheds light on how different policy instruments that
stimulate R&D activities interact with each other.
III. DATA AND VARIABLES
III (i). Sample
The empirical analysis relies on data from the Community Innovation
Survey (CIS) carried out in Spain between 2000 and 2005 by the National
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4 The sampling design of the CIS survey is as
follows.All ﬁrmsthathavereceived anyformofpublicsupport forR&D or
those that have reported R&D expenses, in the last 20 years, are surveyed
every year. The rest of the surveyed ﬁrms come from a random sample
stratiﬁed by size and sector among non-R&D performing ﬁrms. Given that
Spanishﬁrmshavealegalobligationtorespondtoquestionnairessubmitted
by the INE, the response rate is usually large (around 90%). Firms that do
notundertakeanyR&Dactivityduringtheperiodunderstudyareexcluded
from the analysis.
5 After removing ﬁrms with missing values and ﬁrms that
did not report any positive internal R&D expenditure during the whole
period, we are left with an unbalanced panel of ﬁrms across a period of ﬁve
years, comprising 5045 observations.
6
III (ii). Core Variables
Private R&D In the survey, ﬁrms are asked to report their total
expenditures in internal R&D activities.
7 They also have to report the
percentage breakdown of the different sources of funds: internal funds;
other ﬁrms; public agencies; universities and non-proﬁt institutions; EU
programs or foreign funds. Internal funds, corresponding to privately
ﬁnanced internal R&D expenses, is the dependent variable in the empirical
analysis (Private R&D). Due to the skewness of the distribution, we use the
logarithm of one plus the level of this variable in our estimations.
PublicSupport Thelevelofpublicsupportisdeﬁnedasthetotalamount
of non-repayable public funds received by the ﬁrm, in order to ﬁnance
internal R&D activities. It does not include public loanssince loansmust be
reimbursed and are, therefore, classiﬁed as internal funds in the survey. Our
independent variable measuring public support (Public Support) consists,
therefore, of subsidies and public funds for R&D activities proceeding from
contracts between the ﬁrm and public agencies. Due to the skewness of the
distribution we use the logarithm of one plus the level of public support in
4Wedonothavethecompletesamplefortheyear2001soourpanelincludestheyears2000,
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005.
5The inclusion of these ﬁrms does not alter our main ﬁndings. See footnote 19 for more
details.
6Wecheckedthattherecordsremovedformissingvalueswerenotdifferentfromthesample
we used ﬁnally. Speciﬁcally, for several observable dimensions, we could not reject the null
hypotheses of equal means for the ﬁrms included in the sample and those left out. As a further
robustness check, an earlier version of the paper used only a cross-section from the year 2002
(and lagged independent variables from the year 2000) to run our regressions. This sample
included 1,265 ﬁrms and delivered qualitatively similar ﬁndings.
7Precisely,thisisdeﬁnedas‘creativetasksdevelopedinsidetheﬁrminasystematicwaywith
the purpose of increasing the know-how to create new or improved applications as products
(goods or services) or processes (including research in software).’
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8Giventhatsubsidiesandcontractsaretwodifferentpolicy
mechanisms, and exploiting the fact that the survey provides disaggregated
information about the relative amount of subsidies and contracts for the
years 2003 and 2005, we use that information to test the robustness of our
resultsbyfocusingonlyonthosesectorsforwhichcontracts arehardlyused
(see section V on extensions).
9
Appropriability Only for the year 2000, the survey has a section with
seven questions where ﬁrms are asked about the effectiveness of different
appropriability mechanisms that are classiﬁed in two groups: ‘written
methods’ (patents, models/designs, trademarks and copyrights) and
‘strategic methods’ (trade secret, design complexity and lead time). The
answers are displayed on a Likert scale from 1 (important) to 4
(unimportant). These two kinds of appropriability mechanisms are known
in the literature as legal and strategic appropriability mechanisms (see, for
instance, Cassiman and Veugelers [2002]). We use the 2000 survey data to
build a ﬁrm-level measure of appropriability (Appropriability); that is the
sum of the scores for the four questions regarding legal protection
mechanisms (patents, models/designs, trademarks and copyrights) and
rescale it such that it varies between 0 (minimum level) and 1 (maximum
level).
Concerning our measure of appropriability it is worthwhile to discuss the
following issues. First, since we only have data on appropriability for the
year 2000, our measure has no time variation. We therefore assume that
appropriabilitydepends essentiallyon characteristics that areconstant over
time, or at least during the period under analysis. Second, we restrict our
measure to those questions related to legal appropriability mechanisms
because we want to explore the interaction between public support and the
effectiveness of IPR, which are policy mechanisms. Moreover, legal
appropriability in Spain is unlikely to have varied substantially over the
period under scrutiny. However, results (see section V(i) on extensions) do
not change qualitatively, when we include questions related to strategic
methods, in our measure of appropriability. Finally, some comments
concerningtheuseofaﬁrmlevelmeasureofappropriability.Cockburnand
Griliches [1988] explore the ability of different appropriability measures,
based on subjective assessments from the Yale Survey data (Levin et al.
[1987]), to explain inter-industry differences. They ﬁnd that measures based
on all appropriability mechanisms (strategic and legal) were less effective as
proxiesforindustryappropriabilityregimes thanthosebasedexclusivelyon
8In an earlier version of the paper, we have estimated our regressions in levels obtaining
qualitatively similar results.
9David et al. [2000] discuss the potential differences between both kinds of R&D policies
when trying to measure the net effect on privately ﬁnanced R&D expenses.
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legal appropriability at an intra-industry level rather than across industry
averages. This large intra-industry variation could be due to differences in
managers’ opinions when responding to the survey as well as to perceived
differencesinthepotentialusethatthesameappropriabilitymechanismhas
for different ﬁrms. Although using managers’ perceptions introduces some
subjectivity in our measure of appropriability, those perceptions are key in
driving ﬁrms’ R&D decisions. Thus, some measurement error notwith-
standing, a ﬁrm-level measure of appropriability captures ﬁrm-level
variations within sectors, and has more explanatory power than industry
averages (Cassiman and Veugelers [2002]).
Given that the purpose of this paper is to capture the moderating role of
appropriability on the relationship between public support for R&D
activities and privately ﬁnanced internal R&D expenses, we introduce an
interaction term between our measures of public support and appropria-
bility in all estimated speciﬁcations.
III (iii). Control Variables
We include several variables to control for other sources of heterogeneity
across ﬁrms, with respect to their R&D decisions.
Financial constraints are expected to affect the level of privately ﬁnanced
R&D expenditures because ﬁrms facing ﬁnancial constraints have a higher
marginal cost of capital (Hall [2002], Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005]). In
most studies, ﬁnancial constraints have been proxied by ﬁrm size.
Fortunately, the Spanish CIS survey allows us to build a quite precise
measure of ﬁnancial constraints. In fact, except for the year 2002, ﬁrms are




questions and rescale the total such that it varies between 0 and 1, where 0
indicates that ﬁnancial constraints are unimportant while 1 stands for the
highest degree of importance. We deﬁne such a variable as Financial
Constraints. For the year 2002, we assign the average level of the computed
index for the years 2000 and 2003.
11
Previous evidence suggests that public support is less effective for less
ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. For instance, Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005]
demonstrate that government funding disproportionately helps ﬁrms from
industries that are more dependent on external ﬁnance. It is, therefore, very
10Thethreefactorsthatﬁrmsareaskedtorateaspotentialimpedimentstoinnovationare:a)
excessive economic risks; b) high innovation costs; c) lack of suitable external ﬁnance for
innovation activity. Scores go from 1 (very important) to 4 (unimportant). Results do not
change qualitatively if we use the answers to c) only.
11Results are not qualitatively affected if we simply exclude the year 2002 from the analysis.
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effect of ﬁnancial constraints in order to avoid spurious correlations
between our main variable of interest (i.e., the interaction between our
measures of public support and appropriability) and privately ﬁnanced
internal R&D expenses. So, we also include, as an additional control, the
interaction between our measures of public support and ﬁnancial
constraints.
Wecontrolforﬁrmsizebyusingasaproxythetotalnumberofemployees
(Size), and we enter it in logarithm in our estimations. Firm size may be
correlatedwithR&Deffortbecauselargerﬁrmsmayobtaingreaterbeneﬁts
fromeconomiesofscaleandscope(Cohen[1995]).Inaddition,ﬁrmsizeisan
alternative proxy for, and inversely related to, the existence of ﬁnancial
constraints.
We expect a ﬁrm’s ability to undertake R&D activities to be associated
with the level of R&D effort. First, to control for ‘unobserved innovation
ability,’ we include in most ofourestimations, ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Second,we
also include the share of exports over total sales (Exports Intensity) and the
proportion of highly skilled employees (Skilled Employment) to control for
changes, over time, for such unobserved innovation ability.
Finally all speciﬁcations include year dummies; sector dummies with the
two-digit CNAE code (a Spanish equivalent of the SIC classiﬁcation for
U.S. industries) and geographical dummies by Spanish province.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
IV (i). Descriptive Evidence
Table I shows descriptive statistics for the variables described above across
differentcategoriesofﬁrms.Thegroupofﬁrmsthatreceivedpublicsupport
for R&D activities is clearly different from the group of non-supported
ﬁrms. The former category demonstrates signiﬁcantly higher levels of





of appropriability and lower levels of ﬁnancial constraints. This could
suggestthatpublicgrantsarenotbeingefﬁcientlyassignedtoﬁrmsforwhich
the market failures associated with R&D activities are more severe. We do
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant size differences in our sample between supported and
non-supported ﬁrms. Turning to non-R&D performers, as expected, they
report lower levels of appropriability and higher ﬁnancial constraints to
undertakeinnovationactivities.Theyalsoreportaloweraveragepropensity
to export than R&D performers, while no signiﬁcant differences in size.
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appropriability.
Exhibits(a)and(b)suggestthattheelasticityofprivatelyﬁnancedinternal
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Public Support and Privately Financed Internal R&D Expenses
Note: These graphs plot the logarithm of one plus public support and the logarithm of one plus
privately ﬁnanced internal R&D expenses for the observations with positive public support. The
line corresponds to the linear prediction of the univariate regression model for each sub-sample.













Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Private R&D 1742
    7495 581 3124 – –
Public Support 342 1311 ––––
Appropriability 0.20
    0.24 0.15 0.21 0.04 0.14
Financial Constraints 0.42
    0.27 0.50 0.30 0.70 0.32
Size 482 1458 448 3489 436 670
Skilled Employment 0.07
    0.13 0.02 0.05 – –
Exports Intensity 0.32
    0.29 0.25 0.27 0.12 0.23
Note:R&DperformersareﬁrmsthathavemadesomeR&DinvestmentintheperiodunderanalysiswhileNon-
R&D performers are those ﬁrms that did not perform any positive internal R&D expenditure during the whole
period. Private R&D and Public Support are in thousands of euros. The unit of observation is ﬁrm/year. We
report the results of the t-test for the difference in means between supported and non-supported ﬁrms where
   indicates po0.01;
  indicates po0.05 and
 indicates po0.1.
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appropriability. For ﬁrms reporting appropriability levels lower than the
sample median, the elasticity doubles that of those ﬁrms reporting higher
levelsofappropriability.Soaccordingtothispreliminaryevidencethereisa
positive correlation between public support and privately ﬁnanced R&D
expenditures, which decreases with the level of ﬁrm appropriability.
However, as we discuss in detail below, one should be cautious about
interpretingthisevidenceasacausallinksincetheremaybeomittedfactors,
correlated with either public support and privately ﬁnanced internal R&D
expenses, which generate these results. The rest of the empirical analysis is
devoted to exploiting the panel structure of the data in order to investigate
this issue.
IV (ii). Endogeneity of Public Support
AcentralissueinestimatingtheimpactofpublicsupportpoliciesforR&Dis
how to deal with its potential endogeneity. The empirical evidence on R&D
support policies shows that supported and non-supported ﬁrms differ
signiﬁcantly, thereby indicating that public support is not randomly
allocated across ﬁrms. The non-randomness of public support has two
potentialsources:theself-selectionofﬁrmsintheparticipationstageandthe
selectioncriteriaappliedbypublicagenciestoassignthesupport.Blanesand
Busom [2004] provide evidence of the existence of self-selection in the
participation stage for a sample of Spanish manufacturing ﬁrms. They ﬁnd
that larger ﬁrms and those with previous experience in R&D activities are
more likely to participate in R&D subsidy programs. Concerning the
selection criteria, although theoretically public support should be targeted
to those ﬁrms that are more affected by the market failures associated with
R&D activities, in practice, public agencies have incentives to select ﬁrms
thataresuccessfulatinnovating(‘pickupthewinners’)inordertoprovethe
effectivenessof the program (Wallsten [2000]). Since the characteristics that
drive both types of selection are also likely to affect the ﬁrm’s R&D
investment decision, then public support may not be exogenous to privately
ﬁnanced internal R&D expenditures. For instance, ﬁrms with greater
innovationabilitymightbemorelikelytobothapplyforpublicsupportand
receive it, and at the same time might have greater incentives to invest in
R&D activities.
To reduce the possible spurious correlation between public support and
privately ﬁnanced internal R&D expenditures, we include in all of our
speciﬁcations several ﬁrm level time-variant control variables. Most
importantly, we include ﬁrm ﬁxed effects that may be effective to proxy
for ﬁrms’ innovation ability, particularly if one thinks that innovation
ability is constant over short time periods. However, even after including
multiple controls, there still may be unobservable time-variant variables
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the OLS estimation of the marginal effect of public support. Thus, we use
instrumental variables as a means to address the remaining endogeneity of
public support.
As Lichtenberg [1988] points out, an ideal instrument for the amount of
public support would be the amount of funds that are ‘potentially
awardable’ to the ﬁrm. We use the budget dedicated to R&D policies,
across geographical regions and sectors, as an instrument for public
grants.
12 We expect this variable to be correlated with the amount of public
support for ﬁrms belonging to a given geographical region and sector, since
the higher the potential budget the higher the likelihood of getting a grant.
Also, since the budget is a policy decision, we expect it to be exogenous with
respect to unobserved variables affecting a ﬁrm’s R&D investment.
13 In
other words, we assume that, after including several control variables, the
public budget for R&D support policies in a given sector/region is an
exogenoussourceofvariationofﬁrmpublicsupport.Hence,thevariationin
this instrument results from the availability of public support and not from
the access to it, thus obviating the selection problem that makes public
support potentially endogenous. Given the lack of information about the
publicbudgetforR&Dpolicies,weusethetotalamountforpublicgrantsby
geographical region and sector, received by all ﬁrms included in the CIS
survey, as a proxy for the true budget (Public Support_IV). Recall that the
entire population of ﬁrms that receive some sort of public support is
surveyed every year. Moreover, given the high response rate in the Spanish
CIS survey (90%) and the fact that, typically, the entire available public
budget is distributed, thedifference between our proxy and the real variable
is likely to be very small.
14
Since all speciﬁcations include two interaction terms involving public
support, one with appropriability and the other with ﬁnancial constraints,
we instrument these two interaction terms with the product of our
instrument for public support and each of the corresponding variables
(appropriability and ﬁnancial constraints) respectively (see Wooldridge
[2002], pp.122 for a similar approach).
12Regions correspond to Comunidades Auto ´ nomas and sectors with the two digit CNAE
codes.
13Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005] report that when controlling for (not) having received a
subsidy,theavailabilityofpublicfunding(theirkeyvariable)stillhasapositiveandsigniﬁcant
effect on ﬁrms’ R&D investment. The potential economic explanation is that ﬁrms in regions
with relatively higher availability of public funding are more likely to invest in R&D with the
expectation of receiving a subsidy. We perform a similar estimation (results available upon
request) and we do not ﬁnd such an ‘anticipation effect’ in our dataset.
14The mean value of this instrumental variable (Public support_IV) is 1064, being the
minimum value 0 and the maximum one 9,650 (units in thousand of euros).
APPROPRIABILITY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR R&D 747
r 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation r 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
Economics. 12Summingup,ourbasicestimationstrategyconsistsofusingaﬁxedeffects
transformation and then applying pooled 2SLS, where the instruments for
the three endogenous variables are time demeaned (see [Wooldridge] 2002,
pp.321,foramoredetaileddescriptionofthisapproach).Severalrobustness
checks, all conﬁrming our main ﬁnding, are described and reported in
section V.
IV (iii). Results
Table II shows the basic results; column (1) corresponds to the OLS
estimateswithoutﬁxedeffects,column(2)incorporatesﬁrmﬁxedeffectsand
column (3) reports the instrumental variable estimation including ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects and using the instruments described above. Some comments about
the speciﬁcations are necessary at this stage. First, as we take the logarithm
of both privately ﬁnanced internal R&D expenses and public support, the
central coefﬁcient of interest is interpreted as an elasticity. Second, control
variables are included with one period lag in order to attenuate potential
endogeneity.Wethusneedtodroptheﬁrstperiodandweareleftwith4,008
observations. Third, in addition to the control variables reported in the
table, all estimations include year, sector and geographical dummies.
15
Fourth,giventhatAppropriabilityhasnotimevariation,wedonotincludeit
in the speciﬁcations with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, since it cannot be identiﬁed. In
other words, the direct effect of appropriability is included in the ﬁrm ﬁxed
effect. Finally, the reported standard errors are clustered by ﬁrm for all
speciﬁcations,sotheyarerobusttoheteroscedasticityandserialcorrelation.
We start by discussing column (3), which is the speciﬁcation that tackles
all endogeneity issues and yields consistent coefﬁcients, and next we
compare it with the OLS estimates (columns 1 and 2) in order to assess the
effectiveness of our strategy to address the endogeneity of public support.
16
The key ﬁnding emerging from column (3) is that the elasticity of privately
ﬁnanced internal R&D expenditures with respect to public support
decreases as the level of appropriabilty increases (coefﬁcient  0.41,
signiﬁcant at 1%).
There are a couple of plausible explanations for this ﬁnding. First, ﬁrms
with stronger appropriability are more likely to ask for public support
purelyasawayofreducingthecostofprojectsthatwereproﬁtableintheﬁrst
place without such support; whereas those ﬁrms that face appropriability
problemsaremorelikelytoaskforpublicsupportinordertomakeanR&D
project proﬁtable. Second, the literature suggests that public support
15Sector and geographical dummies are included in addition to ﬁrm ﬁxed effects because
some ﬁrms (although very few) report changes in their sector classiﬁcation or geographical
location during the period under analysis.
16We report all speciﬁcations with both interaction terms simultaneously, but coefﬁcients
are not sensitive to their sequential inclusion.
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undertaken by the ﬁrm. This leads to an easier and cheaper access to
additional funds (Lerner [1999]). This certiﬁcation effect is likely to depend
on the degree of appropriability. Speciﬁcally, when appropriability is weak,
ﬁrms are less likely to disclose important information about their R&D
projects. In other words, the amount of information divulged, concerning
R&D plans, is limited if intellectual property cannot be protected
adequately. By contrast, when appropriability is more effective, ﬁrms can
release information to the market without risking misappropriation. Thus,
the endorsement perceived by the award of public support has a stronger
effect for ﬁrms with weak appropriability, compared with those with
effective protection mechanisms for their innovations.
17
Concerning the other interaction term, we ﬁnd that the elasticity of
privatelyﬁnancedinternalR&Dexpenditureswithrespecttopublicsupport
isalsocontingentontheimportanceofﬁnancialconstraints.Consistentwith
previous empirical evidence (Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005]) the stimulus
effect of public support increases with the strength of the ﬁnancial
constraints. As mentioned above, ﬁrms with a higher degree of appro-
priabilitymighthavefewerproblemsinraisingfundsfortheirR&Dactivity,
suggesting a negative correlation between the importance of ﬁnancial
constraints and appropriability (the correlation is indeed negative and
signiﬁcant in our sample, r5  0.12). This argument highlights the
importance of including the interaction between public support and
ﬁnancial constraints as a control in order to avoid upward bias in the
estimation of the moderator effect of appropriability.
18
Finally, regarding the other control variables, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms facing
stronger ﬁnancial constraints invest less private money in internal R&D.
Also,ﬁrmswithhigherproportionofskilledemployeesandshareofexports
over sales invest relatively more private money in internal R&D. This result
wasexpectedsincebothvariablesarerelatedtoaﬁrm’sinnovationability.It
however vanishes when we control for ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Finally, ﬁrm size is
17In order to further explore this possible explanation of a ‘certiﬁcation effect,’ we have
estimated a speciﬁcation using an indicator variable (i.e., a dummy) for public support instead
ofthelogarithmofoneplustheamountofpublicsupportreceived.Results(whichareavailable
upon request) are qualitatively unchanged and highly signiﬁcant. This reveals that,
independently of the size of the subsidy, ﬁrms with low appropriability invest more once
they receive a grant than those ﬁrms for which appropriability mechanisms are more effective.
This ﬁnding further conﬁrms the higher value of the signaling of public grants for ﬁrms with
weakappropriability.Wecannotestimateaspeciﬁcationthatincludesboththedummyandthe
amountofpublicsupportbecausewedonothaveseparateinstruments,andbecauseofthehigh
correlation between the two.
18Since size may also proxy the importance of ﬁnancial constraints, we also run a
speciﬁcation in which we include a third interaction term between public support and ﬁrm size
asarobustnesscheck.Thisinteractionshowsuptobeinsigniﬁcant.Mostimportantly,allother
coefﬁcientsremainpracticallyunchanged.Resultsareavailablefromtheauthorsuponrequest.
APPROPRIABILITY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR R&D 749









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































750 LILIANA GELABERT, ANDREA FOSFURI, AND JOSEP A. TRIBO ´









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































APPROPRIABILITY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR R&D 751
r 2009 The Authors. Journal compilation r 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
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maybeexplainedbyeconomiesofscaleandscopeinR&Dactivityforbigger
ﬁrms.
Concerning the validity of the instruments used, columns (3a), (3b) and
(3c) show the results from the ﬁrst stage estimations of the speciﬁcation in
column (3). There is one reduced form equation for each potentially
endogenous variable. The estimated coefﬁcients conﬁrm that each instru-
ment is partially correlatedwith the potentially endogenous variable, which
is a necessary condition for the validity of the selected instrument. Since we
have multiple endogenous regressors we report the partial R-squared
measure proposed by Shea [1997], which takes intercorrelations among
instruments into account in order to test for the sufﬁcient relevance of the
instruments to explain the endogenous regressors. Results from the Shea
partial R-squared suggest that the instruments are relevant; however, the
instrument for the interaction with ﬁnancial constraints appears to be
weakerthantheothertwobecauseofitslowerpartialR-squaredandthefact
that, although signiﬁcant, its partial correlation is close to zero.
To assess the effectiveness of our empirical strategy to control for the
endogeneity of public support, let us compare estimates across speciﬁca-
tions. As we discussed in the previous section, the endogeneity of public
supportgeneratesabiasintheestimatedcoefﬁcientofpublicsupport,which
depends on the sources of the endogeneity. Usually, the empirical literature
onpublicsupportforR&Dactivitiesarguesthatthebiasispositive,thereby
implyingthattheunobservablesarepositivelycorrelatedwithbothreceiving
public support and investing private money in internal R&D activities.
Table II shows that, after incorporating ﬁrm ﬁxed effects (i.e., moving from
column (1) to column (2)), the coefﬁcients for Public Support and for its
interaction with Financial Constraints drop signiﬁcantly, while the
coefﬁcient for its interaction with Appropriability remains around the same
level. Overall, these changes imply that the elasticity of privately ﬁnanced
internal R&D expenditures with respect to public support becomes lower.
Asarguedabove,ﬁrmﬁxedeffectsareexpectedtocontrolforaﬁrm’sability
to innovate and thus they attenuate the positive bias resulting from the self-
selection of the participation stage and from public agencies’ incentives to
‘pick up the winners’ when they award support.
Finally, we compare the coefﬁcients of the speciﬁcations in columns (2)
and (3), namely, after we instrument for the endogenous variables as
explained above. Notice that while the direct effect of public support
remains almost unchanged, the coefﬁcient of its interaction with Appro-
priability becomes more negative, thus contributing to a reduction in the
overall elasticity of privately ﬁnanced internal R&D expenditures with
respecttopublicsupport.Thisgoesinthedirectionhighlightedintherelated
literature. However the change in the coefﬁcient for the interaction between
Public Support and Financial Constraints is positive. The increase in the
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althoughthepartialcorrelationbetweentheinstrumentandtheendogenous
variable is signiﬁcant, its magnitude is very close to zero, as reported in
column (3c).
V. EXTENSIONS
We ran several other speciﬁcations to verify the robustness of the
signiﬁcance of the interaction term between appropriability and public
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Financial Constraintsit 1  0.93
   0.94








Skilled Employmentit 1  0.46  0.20  1.32
(1.27) (1.27) (2.84)







Log(1þOther Fundsit 1)–  0.02 –
(0.03)
Constant  0.16
   0.16
   0.20
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Observations 4008 4008 2473
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04
Note:Allmodelsareestimatedbyinstrumentalvariables.Column(1)includesthelogofoneplusexternalR&D
investments as an additional control; column (2) includes the log of one plus other sources of funds as an
additional control and column (3) restricts the estimation to those ﬁrms belonging to sectors where public
contractsarehardlyused.TheinstrumentforpublicsupportisexplainedinsectionIV(ii)andbothinteractions
withpublicsupportareinstrumentedwiththeinteractionbetweentheinstrumentforpublicsupportandeachof
the corresponding variables (Appropriability and Financial Constraints). All speciﬁcations include year, sector,
geographical dummies and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects. Firm ﬁxed effects are included in addition to sector and
geographical dummies because some ﬁrms (although very few) report changes in its sector classiﬁcation or
geographicallocationduringtheperiodunderanalysis.Appropriabilityisnotincludedasanadditionalcontrol
becausesinceitdoesnothavevariationovertimeitseffectisincludedintheﬁrmﬁxedeffect.Standarderrors,in
parentheses, are clustered by ﬁrm and so robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
   indicates po0.01,
  indicates po0.05 and
 indicates po0.1.
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of public support.
Previous studies have documented the existence of complementarity
betweeninternalandexternalR&Dactivities(e.g.,CassimanandVeugelers
[2006]).Giventhisevidence,wemaybeconcernedthatchangesinthelevelof
external R&D investments (External R&D) could affect the decision to
investininternalR&D.Weinclude,therefore,incolumn(1)ofTableIII,the
logarithm of one plus the level of external R&D expenditures, with one
period lag, as an additional control. This variable is signiﬁcant and has a
positive sign suggesting the presence of some complementarity between
internaland externalR&D.However,this does notaffectourcentral result.
Another concern is related to other possible sources of support for
internalR&Dactivities.Theanalysisisaimedatmeasuringthepotentialfor
public support to stimulate ﬁrms to spend additional private funds on
internal R&D activities. We consider public support as composed of funds
provided by Spanish public agencies. However, there are other sources of
non repayable funds for internal R&D, like: universities, non-proﬁt
institutions, EU programs or foreign funds (Other Funds). Changes in the
availability of these other sources of funds could systematically affect a
ﬁrm’sdecisiononprivatelyﬁnancedinternalR&Dexpenditures.Inorderto
takeintoaccountthispossiblesourceofvariation,weintroduceasacontrol
variable, with a single period lag, the logarithm of one plus the sum of these
othersourcesoffunds.Resultsarepresentedincolumn(2)ofTableIII.This
new control is not signiﬁcant and does not change the key ﬁndings.
We also ensure that our results are unaffected by our measure of public
support, which includes both subsidies and contracts. In order to do so, we
use disaggregated information about public support, provided by the
surveysfortheyears2003and2005toﬁndtheindustrieswherecontractsare
more frequent. Using this information, we compute the average level of
public contracts, within each sector, and exclude those ﬁrms belonging to
sectors reporting a use of contracts higher than the average level. This is the
case for the following sectors: Chemical (CNAE 24), Machinery and
Medical Equipment (CNAE 29), Electronic Material (CNAE 32), Other
Transport Equipment (CNAE 35), Research and Development (CNAE 73)
andLeisure,CultureandSports(CNAE92).Accordingtoourdataset,these
sectors account for almost 90% of the public contracts in 2003 and 2005.
After dropping these sectors, we loose 1535 observations. Column (3) of
TableIIIshowstheresultsofthere-estimationwiththisnewsample.Again,
coefﬁcients are very slightly affected and the key result of the analysis is
robust.
Althoughnotreportedhere,weensurethatthemainresultisnotdrivenby
the particular measure of appropriability. We tried other measures, taking
intoaccountnotonlylegalbutalsostrategicmechanisms.Asarguedbefore,
aﬁrm’sR&Ddecisionswillbeinﬂuencedbyitsperceptionofthepotentialto
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either of the surveyed mechanisms (legal or strategic). So, we estimate our
regressionswiththefollowingtwoalternativemeasures:thehighestscorefor
the seven questions regarding protection mechanisms; and the sum of the
seven scores. The results are qualitatively unchanged.
Another issue we explored is to what extent this negative interaction
between public support and appropriability is sustained or reverses over
time (estimation available upon request). In order to analyze this issue we
have estimated the speciﬁcation in column (3) of Table II by adding one lag
of public support and one lag of each of the interaction terms (with
appropriability and ﬁnancial constraints). The coefﬁcients on the con-
temporaneousvariablesremainaroundthesamelevelandhighlysigniﬁcant
as in column (3) of Table II, the lagged public support is positive and
signiﬁcant, while the lagged interaction term with appropriability is
negative, but only signiﬁcant at 12%. These results suggest that there is
some persistence in the effect of public support, but that the differential
effect according to the level of appropriability is mostly contemporaneous.
Another possible concern is the potential bias resulting from having an
unbalanced panel. Wooldridge [2002] analyzes the conditions under which
ﬁxed effect estimations are consistent with unbalanced panels. He ﬁnds that
sample bias is not a problem if the selection is uncorrelated with the
idiosyncratic error term of the estimated equation. In order to test this
assumption,weincludealeadselectionindicatorinthespeciﬁcationandtest
for its signiﬁcance. In our panel, each ﬁrm appears in period t only if it had
appeared in period t 1. Then, for attriters our selection indicator switches
from zero to one in the period just before the attrition. The selection
indicator is not signiﬁcant when included in the ﬁxed effects model. So we
can rule out the existence of selection bias arising from the unbalanced
nature of our panel.




is zero. So we take this into account and estimate a Tobit model.
Unfortunately, when T (the number of periods) is small we cannot treat
ﬁrm unobserved heterogeneity as a parameter to estimate because of the
‘incidental parameters problem’ that produces inconsistent estimates in
nonlinear models, with ﬁxed effects (as discussed in Neyman and Scott
[1948], Wooldridge [2002]). A recent work by Green [2004] shows that
although the estimation bias for the slope parameters in the case of Tobit
modelsisnotsevere,theestimationofthedisturbancevarianceisdownward
biased and would,therefore, betransmitted to the estimates of the marginal
effects.Therefore, ratherthan treatingtheunobservedeffectsasparameters
to be estimated, we follow Chamberlain [1984] to model the distribution of
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variables. This model allows the instrument to be systematically correlated
with time-constant omitted factors. In addition, we take into account the
potential endogeneity of public support using the same set of instruments
described before. In the Appendix, following Wooldridge [2002] and
WooldridgeandPapke[2007],wederivetheﬁnalmodeltobeestimatedafter
taking into account endogeneity, time invariant unobserved heterogeneity
and the censored status of the dependent variable.
In essence, to address endogeneity the estimation follows two steps, and
includes the ﬁrm level average of all exogenous variables in all estimated
equations to model ﬁrm ﬁxed effects as explained above (Chamberlain
[1984]). More precisely, in the ﬁrst step we estimate three reduced form
equations(oneforeachofthethreeendogenousvariables).Theseequations
include each corresponding instrument, the other exogenous variables and
the ﬁrm level average of all exogenous variables (including the exclusion
restrictions). In the second step, we estimate a pooled Tobit for privately
ﬁnanced internal R&D expenditures on the three endogenous variables, the
exogenous control variables, the ﬁrm level average of all exogenous
variables and the residuals of the ﬁrst step estimations. The coefﬁcients of
the residuals provide a test for endogeneity conditional on having good
instruments.
Table IV summarizes the results of the Tobit model estimated by
instrumentalvariablesandincludingﬁrmﬁxedeffects(column1)andforits
corresponding ﬁrst stage estimations (columns 1a–1c). Table V reports the
marginal effects of the variables of interest evaluated at the mean of the
independent variables (column a), at the 5% and 95% percentiles of public
supportandatthemeanoftheotherindependentvariables(columnsb1and
b2) and some descriptive statistics of the distribution of the marginal effects
across all sample observations (column c). The distribution of marginal
effects across all sample observations is skewed (left skewed for Public
Support and for its interaction with Financial Constraints, and right skewed
for its interaction with Appropriability). However, the mean, median and
mode are extremely close. In addition, the values for the 5% and 95%
percentilesshowthatfor90%oftheobservations,theestimatedcoefﬁcients
arequiteconcentratedaroundthemean, so themarginal effects at themean
seem to be a good representation of the marginal effects for the whole
sample. Interesting enough, the marginal effects at the mean are not very
different from the estimated elasticities of speciﬁcation (3) of Table II,
further conﬁrming the robustness of the ﬁndings.
19
19The results are also qualitatively unchanged if we use the unrestricted sample instead of
focusingontheanalysisofthesampleofﬁrmsthatperformsomeR&Dduringtheperiodunder
analysis. In the unrestricted sample internal R&D expenses is uncensored for 3,203
observations and censored for the remaining 2,418.
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ﬁnanced internal R&D expenses with respect to public support. Using the
averagelevelofpublicsupport,appropriabilityandﬁnancialconstraintsfor
thewholesample,thederivativeis1.25.Ifwedividethesampleaccordingto
the level of appropriability, then for those ﬁrms reporting appropriability
lower than the median, the derivative is around 1.75, while for those ﬁrms
reporting appropriability higher than the median it is around 0.60 (almost
threetimessmaller).Giventhatthemaximumsupportprovidedgenerallyto
private ﬁrms by the major support programs in Spain accounts for at most
50% of the project
20, and that the dependent variable of this analysis
corresponds to internal funds invested in R&D (so it does not include the
public support), the derivatives we compute above evidence a strong
stimulusforthegroupofﬁrmswiththelowestlevelsofappropriability.With
regard to the group of ﬁrms with higher appropriability, the average
marginal effect reﬂects a much weaker stimulus. Moreover, we ﬁnd that, at
the average values of all other independent variables, for ﬁrms with
appropriability higher than 0.65 (which are almost 7% of the supported
ﬁrms), we cannot rule out the existence of some crowding-out effect. This
evidenceishoweverweak.Infact,at-testonthehypothesisthattheeffectof
public support is not different from zero for the highest level of
appropriability, (i.e., 1), and evaluating ﬁnancial constraints at the median,
does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis in all speciﬁcations. We can,
however, reject such null hypothesis for speciﬁcation (3) of Table II when




in column (1). There is one reduced form equation for each potentially
endogenous variable. The estimated coefﬁcients conﬁrm that each instrument
is partially correlated with the potentially endogenous variable, which is a
necessary condition for the validity of the selected instrument. In addition,
given the reported F statistic, we reject that the sum of the reduced form
residuals equals zero justifying the use of instrumental variables.
22
20This is the case for programs from the Ministry of Science and Education (PROFIT
Program), Ministry of Transportation and Public Investments (through the Centre for
Experimentation for Public Investments-CEDEX), Ministry of Industry Tourism and
Commerce (CENIT and PROFIT Programs), Madrid Local Government (through the
IMADE and FEDER Programs) and the Ministry of the Environment, among others.
21However, given that the maximum support provided generally to private ﬁrms by the
majorsupportprograms inSpain accountsforat most50%oftheproject,thefactthatoverall
privately ﬁnanced R&D remains ﬂat might imply that some crowding out occurs at non-
supported R&D projects.
22Noticethatwhenthesumofthereducedformresidualsisdifferentfromzero,thestandard
errors of the second stage are not asymptotically valid. Since this is the case in column (1) we
have re-estimated the model by MLE (which provides correct standard errors). Our central
coefﬁcients remain statistically signiﬁcant (see Wooldridge [2002], pp.532).
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As an additional robustness check, we use a matching approach to estimate
the counterfactual of the treated observations of our sample of performing
ﬁrms. We apply the bias corrected nearest-neighbour matching estimator

















2SLS/TOBIT/FE First Stage Regressions of Speciﬁcation (1)
(1) (1a) (1b) (1c)
Log(1þPublic Supportit) 0.18
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(0.08)
Log(1þPublic Support_IVit) – 0.40
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    0.15







    0.39
   
(0.06) (0.01) (0.03)
Appropriabilityi 3.70
     0.21  0.05  0.01
(0.60) (0.29) (0.12) (0.14)
Financial Constraintsit 1 0.21 0.12 0.03 0.16
(0.62) (0.34) (0.09) (0.22)
Log(Sizeit 1)  0.06  0.11  0.01  0.10
(0.42) (0.24) (0.07) (0.13)
Skilled Employmentit 1  8.11
    0.72  0.36  0.60
(2.77) (1.70) (0.45) (1.04)
Export Intensityit 1  0.11  0.40  0.07  0.45
(1.00) (0.51) (0.14) (0.30)
LLog(Public Support_IV) 0.16
    0.08
  0.02
    0.04
   
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
LLog(Public
Support Appropriability_IV)
0.02  0.03 0.01 0.08
(0.16) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07)
LLog(Public Support Financial
Constraints_IV)
 0.09  0.06  0.05
    -
(0.65) (0.06) (0.02)
LFinancial Constraints  1.6
     0.44 0.08  0.40
(0.77) (0.49) (0.13) (0.30)
LSize 0.96
    0.54
    0.06 0.30
   
(0.43) (0.25) (0.08) (0.14)
LSkilled Employment 22.85
    7.29
    1.57
    4.61
   
(3.27) (2.56) (0.75) (1.59)
LExports Intensity 1.27 1.44
    0.32
  0.84
   
(1.08) (0.62) (0.18) (0.36)
Constant 6.71  1.01
     0.06  0.51
  
(5.53) (0.52) (0.16) (0.24)
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another study that uses Spanish data (although they employ a different
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0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.024  2.59 0.23 0.29
Note: marginal effects (a) correspond to the marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of the independent
variables.Marginaleffects(b1)and(b2)correspondtothemarginaleffectsevaluatedatpercentile5%and95%
of public support respectively and at the mean values of the other independent variables. Marginal effects (c)
















2SLS/TOBIT/FE First Stage Regressions of Speciﬁcation (1)
(1) (1a) (1b) (1c)
F (p, q) 2.89







    (113) – – –
Adjusted R-squared – 0.47 0.43 0.44
Note:thespeciﬁcationincolumn(1)isaTobitmodelwithﬁrmﬁxedeffectsestimatedbyinstrumentalvariables
as described in the text. The instrument for public support is explained in section IV (ii) and both interactions
withpublicsupportareinstrumentedwiththeinteractionbetweentheinstrumentforpublicsupportandeachof
the corresponding variables (Appropriability and Financial Constraints). The terms ‘LVariable’ refer to the ﬁrm-
level mean of the corresponding variable. These terms are included in the speciﬁcations to model ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects as explained in section V.The errors of the ﬁrststage estimations are included in speciﬁcationof column
(1);wereporttheFstatisticoftestingthenullhypothesisthatthesumofthereducedformresidualsequalszero.
Columns (1a)-(1c) correspond to the ﬁrst stage estimations of speciﬁcation in column (1). All speciﬁcations
include year, industry and geographical dummies. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by ﬁrm so
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
   indicates po0.01,
  indicates po0.05 and
 indicates po0.1.
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public support), the matchingestimator we propose here tests the effect of a
binary treatment that indicates whether the ﬁrm received public support or
not. Nevertheless, if the results are consistent, it does constitute an
additional piece of support for the central hypothesis of this paper.
Criticaltotheapplicationofmatchingestimatorsistheselectionoftheset
ofcharacteristicsthatwill determinetheconstruction ofthecontrolsample.
The ﬁrst variable used is the propensity score, which is the estimated
probability of receiving public support. In order to generate the propensity
score, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable takes the
value one if the ﬁrm receives public support and zero otherwise. The
independent variables included in the estimation are the following: ﬁrst, a
dummyvariablereportingiftheﬁrmreceivedpublicsupportintheprevious
period to capture persistence in the assignment of public support; second,
ﬁrm level characteristics like size, export propensity, proportion of skilled
workers, appropriability and ﬁnancial constraints (see section III (iii) for a
description of all these variables). Third, we include a dummy variable that
takes the value one if more than ﬁfty percent of the ﬁrm is owned by foreign
capital (Foreign Ownership) to proxy the level of internationalization of the
ﬁrm, which may also inﬂuence the agencydecision toaward public support.
Finally, we include year, sector and geographical dummies.
The results of the estimated speciﬁcation are presented in Table VI. The
percentage of correctly predicted outcomes denotes a reasonable goodness
TableVI
ProbabilityEquationforPublicSupport
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Indicator of Public Support at time t
Indicator of Public Support at timet 1 0.42




Financial Constraintsit 1  0.08
   
(0.02)
Log(Sizeit 1) 0.04
   
(0.01)
Skilled Employmentit–1 0.36
   
(0.13)
Exports Intensityit–1 0.10
   
(0.02)
Foreign Ownershipit 1  0.05
   
(0.01)
Observations 3537
Correctly predicted observations 0.85
Note: The reported coefﬁcients correspond to the marginal effects of the probit model for the probability of
obtaining public support. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm received public support in year t
and zero otherwise. The estimated model includes year, sector and geographical dummies. The percentage of
correctly predicted observations is a weighted average of the percentage of correctly predicted zeros and ones
weighted by the fractions of zero and one outcomes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
   indicates po0.01,
   indicates po0.05 and
  indicates po0.1.
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previous empirical results for Spain (Gonza ´ lez and Pazo ´ [2008], Gonza ´ lez
et al. [2005] and Busom [2000]), which indicate that there is signiﬁcant
persistence in public support and that ﬁrms awarded public support for
R&D activities are typically bigger, have greater research experience, are
more internationalized, but are mostly ﬁnanced by national capital.
Concerning appropriability, although the coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant when
we include the lagged indicator variable for public support, it becomes
highly signiﬁcant when we exclude this variable.
Usingtheestimatedparametersoftheprobitmodelweobtainpredictions
of the probability of getting public support for all sample ﬁrms (propensity
score) that we later use as one of the matching criteria. The other covariates
usedtoconstructthecontrolsamplearethelaggedlevelofprivatelyﬁnanced
internal R&D expenditures to capture persistence in R&D activities, the
lagged public support dummy to capture persistence of public support and
ﬁnally size, sector and time dummies.
23
Table VII provides the mean values of the subsamples of supported, non-
supported ﬁrms and the control group obtained after the matching, for the
whole sample and for the two subgroups with higher and lower level of
appropriability respectively (above and below the median value, respec-
tively).Wereportthetestscomparingthemeanofthetreatedﬁrmswitheach
of the other two groups. While supported and non-supported ﬁrms appear
verydifferentbeforethematching,clearlythedifferenceshavebeenreduced
signiﬁcantly after the matching.
Finally, Table VIII reports the estimated SATT (Sample Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated) on privately ﬁnanced internal R&D
expenses for the whole sample of R&D performing ﬁrms and for the two
subgroupswithhigherandlowerlevelofappropriability.Weﬁndthatwhile
those ﬁrms with appropriability lower than the median invest signiﬁcantly
morewhentheyreceivepublicsupport,theeffectofreceivingpublicsupport
is not signiﬁcantly different from zero for ﬁrms with appropriability higher
than the median. These results are consistent with our contention that the
propensitytodevoteprivateexpensestoR&Dafterreceivingpublicsupport
is larger for ﬁrms that report low appropriability.
Overall, the results of the several robustness checks summarized in this
section support the view that the effect of public support on privately
ﬁnanced internal R&D expenses is heterogeneous across ﬁrms, and that the
level of appropriability explains part of these differences.
23Following Gonza ´ lez and Pazo ´ [2008], we consider two size brackets (less and more than
200 workers) and aggregate manufacturing sectors in accordance with the standard industrial
aggregationoftheSpanishNationalInstituteofStatistics(INE);wealsoaggregateservicesina
single category.
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This paper uses data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for the
period2000–2005carried out inSpainby the National Institute of Statistics
(INE) to investigate the interaction between public support for R&D
activities and appropriability. Taking into account the potential endogene-
ity ofpublic support, ﬁrmunobserved heterogeneity,several other controls,
among which the strength of ﬁnancial constraints, and after running a
variety of robustness tests, we ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant negative
interactionbetween publicsupportandappropriability. More precisely, the
estimated elasticities correspond to a derivative of 0.60 for ﬁrms reporting
higher levels of appropriability (i.e., above the median level), while the
derivativereaches1.75forthoseﬁrmsforwhichappropriabilitymechanisms
areweaker(i.e.,belowthemedianlevel).Onaverage,thestimulationeffectis
therefore three times larger for the half of the sample for which the
appropriability market failure is more severe. In addition to the support of
the existence of a negative moderating effect of appropriability, the
estimatedcoefﬁcientsalsosuggestthepossibilityofsomeextentofcrowding
out among those ﬁrms reporting the highest levels of appropriability.
This paper makes therefore a contribution to the empirical literature on
publicsupportforR&D activities bydemonstratingthattheeffectofpublic
supportisheterogeneousacrossﬁrms,andthatthelevelofappropriabilityis
crucial in explaining those differences. Too often the literature has treated
ﬁrms receiving public support as homogeneous, focusing mainly on the
estimation of the average affect of public support on the level of privately
ﬁnanced R&D expenses. There are some exceptions: Hyytinen and
Toivanen [2005] have provided empirical evidence on the relevance of
ﬁnancial constraints as a contingency factor in the effect of public support.
Gonza ´ lez and Pazo ´ [2008], Gonza ´ lez et al. [2005], Lach [2002] investigate
ﬁrm size as a source of heterogeneity (ﬁrm size is expected to be negatively
relatedtotheaccesstocapitalmarkets).Theyshowthatsmallﬁrmsaremore
reactive to public support than bigger ﬁrms are.
This paper is not the ﬁrst one using Spanish data to analyze the effect of
publicsupport for R&D activities.Acoupleof recent papers(Gonza ´ lezand
TableVIII
AverageTreatmentEffectforTheSupportedFirms









Observations 3528 1508 2020
Treated Group 667 299 368
Control Group 1334 598 736
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroescedasticity.
   indicates po0.01,
  indicates po0.05 and
  indicates po0.1
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Strategies (Encuesta de Estrategias Empresariales) between 1990 and 1999
toassesstheeffectivenessofpublicsupport.However,althoughthesepapers
discuss the role of ﬁrm size, their focus is more about measuring the average
effect of public support and the possible existence of crowding out. Instead,
we are more concerned about explaining the hetoregeneity across ﬁrms due
to the degree of appropriability. To this end, we exploit information
provided exclusively by the CIS survey on the effectiveness of appropria-
bility mechanisms and on the strength of ﬁnancial constraints to build ﬁrm
level measures with thepurpose of decomposing the average effect ofpublic
support along these two dimensions. Despite the different focus of our
paper, and the fact that we use another database and time window, our
resultsare consistent with previous ﬁndingsfor Spanish ﬁrms. First, we ﬁnd
thatpublicsupportgoesmainlytoﬁrmswithsomelevelofR&Dexperience.
Second, our ﬁnding that ﬁnancial constraints as well as the degree of
appropriability play a central role in explaining differences between ﬁrms is
inaccordancetotheﬁndingthatsmallerﬁrmsarestimulatedmorebypublic
support. This is so because small ﬁrms are expected to face more ﬁnancial
constraintsandhavethereforelessdevelopedmechanismsforappropriating
thereturnsoftheirR&Dactivitythanlargeﬁrmsdo.Finally,concerningthe
magnitude of the average effect of public support on privately ﬁnanced
R&D expenses, we ﬁnd a stronger effect for our period of study.
Overall,ourﬁndingssuggestthatwhenappropriabilityisweak,crowdingout
is much less likely than when protection mechanisms are strong and effective.
So,governmentagenciesshouldbeparticularlycarefulwhenallocatingfundsto
ﬁrms with strong appropriability. A related implication is that innovation
policies that are aimed at increasing appropriability, for instance by tightening
up IPR issues, cannot be treated separately from policies aimed at increasing
public support. Indeed, our ﬁndings show indirectly that ignoring this
interaction can give rise to an important misallocation of public money.
APPENDIX
TOBIT MODEL FOR PANEL DATA WITH AN ENDOGENOUS REGRESSOR
In this technical appendix we describe how to estimate a Tobit model for panel data
withalargecross-sectionaldimensionandrelativelyfewtimeperiodsallowingfortime-
constant unobserved effects that can be correlated with the explanatory variables and
for the presence of an endogenous variable.
Assume we have the following model,
ð1Þ yit1 ¼ maxð0; zit1d1 þ a1yit2 þ ci1 þ uit1Þ
ð2Þ yit2 ¼ zitd2 þ ci2 þ uit2
ðuit1; uit2Þjzi; ci1; ci2   bivariate normal
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with one exclusion restriction and uit1 represent time varying omitted factors that can
becorrelatedwithyit2.Forsimplicityweassumeonlyoneendogenousvariable,butthe
extension for more than one is straightforward provided there are sufﬁcient
instruments.
Following Chamberlain [1984] we make the following assumptions to model the
heterogeneity:
ð3Þ ci1 ¼ c1 þ   Ziz1 þ ai1
ð4Þ ci2 ¼ c2 þ   Ziz2 þ ai2
with (ai1., ai2) independent of zi and where   Zi ¼ T 1 PT
t¼1 zit is the vector of time
averages for each exogenous variable (including those omitted from (1)). Plugging (3)
and (4) respectively into (1) and (2) we have
ð5Þ yit1 ¼ maxð0; zit1d1 þ a1yit2 þ c1 þ   Ziz1 þ ai1 þ uit1Þ
ð6Þ yit2 ¼ c2 þ zitd2 þ   Ziz2 þ ai2 þ uit2
and under joint normality,
vit1 ¼ r1vit2 þ eit1; eit1jðzi;vit2Þ Normalð0;s2
e1Þ; t ¼ 1;...;T:
Where vit15ai1þuit1 and vit25ai2þuit2 So ﬁnally we can write,
ð7Þ yit1 ¼ maxð0; c1 þ zit1d1 þ   Ziz1 þ a1yit2 þ r1vit2 þ eit1Þ
Because eit1 is independent of (zi, vit2) it is also independent of yit2. Now yit2 is
contemporaneously exogenous in (7) but not necessarily strictly exogenous so we
proceedtoestimateinthefollowingtwostages.FirstweestimatepooledOLSofyit2on
1, zit,   Zi and get the residuals ^ vit2. The next step is to estimate pooled Tobit of yit1 on 1,
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